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Abstract
Material punishment has been suggested to play a key role in sustaining human cooperation. Experimental findings,
however, show that inflicting mere material costs does not always increase cooperation and may even have detrimental
effects. Indeed, ethnographic evidence suggests that the most typical punishing strategies in human ecologies (e.g., gossip,
derision, blame and criticism) naturally combine normative information with material punishment. Using laboratory
experiments with humans, we show that the interaction of norm communication and material punishment leads to higher
and more stable cooperation at a lower cost for the group than when used separately. In this work, we argue and provide
experimental evidence that successful human cooperation is the outcome of the interaction between instrumental
decision-making and the norm psychology humans are provided with. Norm psychology is a cognitive machinery to detect
and reason upon norms that is characterized by a salience mechanism devoted to track how much a norm is prominent
within a group. We test our hypothesis both in the laboratory and with an agent-based model. The agent-based model
incorporates fundamental aspects of norm psychology absent from previous work. The combination of these methods
allows us to provide an explanation for the proximate mechanisms behind the observed cooperative behaviour. The
consistency between the two sources of data supports our hypothesis that cooperation is a product of norm psychology
solicited by norm-signalling and coercive devices.
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Introduction
In natural social contexts, individuals often use punishment to
discourage the violation of norms [1–2], i.e., prescribed behaviours
shared and enforced by a community [3–5]. As a consequence,
punishment is typically considered one of the primary means for
social control and the transmission of norms. However, in
behavioural experiments, and in particular in public goods games,
punishment is usually modelled only as the imposition of material
costs [6–8] and the transmission of norms is restricted by design
(but see [9–14]). Subjects can infer how to behave only from the
punishment received. In such experimental settings, material
punishment may not only be ineffective in sustaining norm
compliance, but may even lead to the erosion of the gains obtained
from increased cooperation [6–7,15–18].
Our hypothesis is that when material punishment is combined
with norm communication, subjects cooperate more and less
punishment is needed. We propose that successful human
cooperation results from the interaction of the norm psychology
[3,19–20] and the cognitive machinery for instrumental decision-
making. Norms inform individuals about how they are prescribed
to behave. Material punishment makes the expected consequences
of violating them more certain thus making norms salient in
subjects’ mind [4,21–23]. Salient norms lead, ceteris paribus, to
higher compliance [23].
Experiment
1. Experiments with Human Subjects
To test our hypothesis, we build an experimental design
utilizing a standard public-goods game with costly punishment [6].
Our novel treatment is one in which the transmission of what is
the norm can be achieved by combining peer communication and
material punishment to form what we call a sanction. In two
control conditions sanctions are decoupled into material punish-
ment and communication; these two treatments are called
punishment and message respectively. This design allows us to
investigate the relative and combined effect of norm communica-
tion and material punishment in promoting cooperation.
Our experiment is built as follows. In all treatments, twelve fixed
groups of four subjects interact over thirty rounds. The first (1–10)
and the last (21–30) ten rounds are identical across treatments. At
every round, each member i of a group independently chooses an
integer contribution level, Ci, between 0 and 20, with the following
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resulting payoff:
Pi~20{Ciz0:4(C1zC2zC3zC4)
After each round all the members of the group are informed
about the contribution levels of each of the other three members.
Since players’ identities persist, subjects can trace one another’s
behaviour throughout the rounds. In rounds 11–20, treatments
differ.
In the punishment treatment, after each round, participants can
assign an integer amount between 0 and 10 punishment units to
each of the other group members. Each assigned punishment unit
costs the punished member 3 units and the punishing member 1
unit. Each punished group member is informed about the ID of all
punishers at the end of each round.
In the message treatment, after each round, participants cannot
inflict material punishment but can send the following message to
the other group members, choosing between options 1), 2) and 3):
‘‘One should contribute X (indicating the demanded token
amount), because 1) in this way we are all better off; 2) it is what
one should do, and 3) if not it will have consequences for you’’.
Options 1) to 3) capture three different reasons for contributing: 1)
achievement of a joint benefit; 2) a sense of duty and 3) a purely
individualistic motivation. Sending the message entails no material
cost for the sender or for the receiver (details are provided in Text
S1, see Figures S1, S2, S3, S4).
In the sanction treatment, participants have, after each round,
the opportunity to both assign punishment points and send a
normative message (details are provided in Text S1).
A treatment similar to our sanction treatment has been used in
[10,14]. In [10], Noussair and Tucker study experimentally the
joint effects of what they call formal and informal sanctions.
Formal sanctions consist in assigning material punishment points
like in our set-up. However, their informal sanctions are very
different from ours. They consist in the possibility of assigning
disapproval points to others without any material consequence (see
also [11]). These informal sanctions are a way of giving a negative
rating, more or less disapproval, to other group members’
decisions. The authors find that being able to use both types of
sanctions leads to a higher increase in cooperation than their
separate use. However, differently from our findings, they show
that the combined use of informal and formal sanctions does not
prevent a detrimental effect of punishment on group’s earnings.
They explain their results in terms of ‘‘a wider array of sanctions,
which provides a greater ability to nuance the disciplinary action
taken against free riders.’’ In contrast to the negative ratings used
in [10], in our design the message has a positive normative
content, by containing a quantitative prescription of how much to
contribute together with a reason for the prescription. We consider
this a more direct and incisive way of conveying information about
norms.
Recently, in [14], Janssen et al. present an experimental
environment in which costly punishment can be combined with
communication to study social-ecological systems. In their set-up
participants can communicate extensively and decide whether or
not to adopt a punishment system and how much the fines should
be. They also allow for the different temporal orders of the
availability of punishment, communication and both and their
results depend to some extent on the order of the treatments.
Among other results, they find that communication with
punishment does not lead to as long-lasting cooperative behavior
as communication without punishment, a result at odds with ours.
In contrast with [14], in our work we chose to keep the treatments
completely separate and to restrict the communication possibilities
to the sending of normative messages and to make the punishment
system exogenously present or absent. In [25,26] another way of
conveying normative information is explored. It is shown how
symbolic punishment, consisting in showing an unhappy face, has
an effect on cooperation.
Apart from the differences in the experimental design, the
novelty of our work consists in combining experiments with
humans and agent-based simulations in order to provide an
explanation for the proximate mechanisms behind human
cooperation. Currently, the need for cross-methodological re-
search is increasingly felt among the social scientists for the sake of
both empirical validation and modeling. While laboratory data
show us the impact of manipulated independent variables on
human behavior, agent based modeling helps us investigate the
internal mechanisms, which generate such behavior.
Results and Discussion
2. Experiments with Human Subjects: Results and
Discussion
Figure 1 A–C shows average contribution levels in the three
treatments, average punishment intensity in the punishment and
sanction treatments, and average punishment frequency in the
same two treatments. During rounds 1–10 contribution levels
decline in all treatments, with average contributions being 8.33,
6.25 and 8.23 in the message, the punishment and the sanction
treatment respectively; the Kruskal-Wallis test does not find any
differences between the three data-sets (p = 0.1821). For rounds
16–20, average contribution levels contribution levels are 9.90,
10.65 and 14.46 in the message, the punishment and the sanction
treatment respectively. This implies that contributions in the
sanction treatment are significantly higher by 36% than in the
punishment treatment and significantly higher by 52% than in the
message treatment; in this case the Kruskall-Wallis test finds
significant differences between the three treatments (p = 0.07). In
the last ten rounds, when punishment and normative message
opportunities are switched off, contributions decay in all three
cases to average levels of 5.05, 3.75 and 9.08 in the message, the
punishment and the sanction treatment respectively. Now
cooperation levels in the sanction treatment exceed by 142%
those obtained in the punishment treatment and by 79% those in
the message treatment, with the Kruskal-Wallis test finding a
significant difference (p= 0.04). Overall, the contribution levels are
quite low with respect to those reported in [6,16], where the same
parameter values are used. An experiment comparing contribution
behaviour in student populations in Spain, the Netherlands, the
US and Japan (see [27]) finds that contributions in Spain (Pompeu
Fabra University) are the lowest, although the difference is not
statistically different.
Using the Mann-Whitney test, the difference between average
contributions in the sanction and the punishment treatments in
rounds 11–20 is significant (p = .048). There is no significant
difference in contributions between sanction and message for
rounds 11–15 (p= .7290), but contributions are significantly
higher in sanction than in message for rounds 16–20 (p = .0179).
Average contributions are significantly higher in the message than
in the punishment treatment (p = .0833) in rounds 11–15, but no
difference in rounds 16–20 (p = .2987).
The average number of punishment points sent is 1.73 times
higher in the punishment than in the sanction treatment (see also
Table S1 and Figure S5 included in the Supporting Information).
Using the Mann-Whitney test, we find that average punishment
points allocated per member is significantly higher in the
Punish Voice
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Figure 1. (A–C) Results of the Experiments with Human Subjects. Panel A depicts the contribution levels obtained in the human experiments.
Panel B depicts the punishment intensity observed in the human experiments. Mean punishment intensity is defined as the average number of
punishment units sent, whenever punishment is used, i.e. all instances of zero punishment are excluded. Panel C depicts the punishment frequency
observed in the human experiments. Punishment frequency measures the average number of times punishment is used, regardless of the number of
punishment units sent.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064941.g001
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punishment than in the sanction treatment (p = .0005) (1.24167 vs.
0.1625 average points sent). Moreover, in the punishment
treatment, the frequency of punishment is 5.68 times higher than
in the sanction treatment. Using the Mann-Whitney test, we find
that in the punishment treatment, the frequency of punishment is
significantly higher than in the sanction treatment (p = .0004).
Figure S4 in the Supporting Information shows mean punishment
as a function of the punished subject’s contribution minus that of
the punisher for the two treatments involving punishment. Table
S3 in the Supporting Information provides support for the idea
that those players who contribute less than asked to are strongly
punished.
Due to higher contributions and lower punishment, average net
earnings are 31% higher in the sanction than in the punishment
treatment for rounds 11–20 and 16% higher than in the message
treatment for rounds 16–20. Unlike in the other two treatments,
earnings in the sanction treatment are 12.38% higher in rounds
11–20 than in rounds 1–10 (see also [14,24]). By using sanction,
the gains from higher contributions are not offset by the associated
punishment costs. Payoffs are higher in the sanction than in the
punishment treatment for rounds 11–15 (p= .0010) and for rounds
16–20 (p= .0055). Payoff levels are not higher in the message than
in the sanction treatments for rounds 11–15 (p = .8174), but are
significantly higher in sanction than in message for rounds 16–20
(p = .0242). Payoffs are significantly higher in the message than in
the punishment treatment (p = .0007) in rounds 11–15, but no
difference in rounds 16–20 (p = .4529).
We can use the within-subjects nature of our design to compare
contribution levels in the second block with those of the first block.
A Wilcoxon test finds that, unlike in the other two treatments, in
the sanction treatment payoffs are significantly higher in rounds
11–20 than in rounds 1–10 (p = .0096) and than in rounds 21–30
(p = .0022). This is in contrast to the results reported in [6–7,18].
In both the message and sanction treatments, messages from
peers help subjects soon to identify the prescribed amount of
contribution and to form expectations about the consequences of
violations. In both treatments, subjects’ expectations and their
behaviours rapidly converge. Figures S1 and S2 in the Supporting
Information show that the percentages of individuals that sent a
message and the average required contribution levels in rounds
11–20 are quite similar for the two relevant treatments. Table S2
in the Supporting Information shows that in both treatments
subjects that ask for high contributions are those who contribute at
high levels. Figure S3 in the Supporting Information shows that
the use of the three different messages differs somewhat across the
two relevant treatments. Specifically, behaviour in the sanction
treatment exhibits a stronger concentration on message 1 (‘‘In this
way we are all better off’’), while in the message treatment message
frequencies are a little more dispersed.
The value added by material punishment to norm communi-
cation consists in strengthening the normative expectations, thus
increasing the norm salience in subjects’ minds. As shown by the
results in the message treatment (and differently from [14]), when
norms are verbally transmitted but not enforced by material
punishment compliance soon declines. Since a high number of
participants deviates from the contribution due, the norm becomes
less salient and inefficient in sustaining compliance. In the sanction
treatment, subjects immediately meet the prescription and the
possible use of punishment only sustains the contribution level
reached. In contrast, in the punishment treatment, in which
information about norms can only be inferred from the material
cost received, the cooperation level reached is substantially lower
and the costs for achieving it is higher than in the sanction
treatment. When modelled only in material terms, punishment is
scarcely effective in helping subjects to find out the norm. Far from
coordinating, subjects separately preceed by trial and error.
Experiment
3. Simulation Experiment
To test our hypothesis about the decision process underlying
observed behaviour, we develop an agent-based model that
explicitly incorporates the norm psychology as part of its decision
making. The motivation for norm compliance is modelled as
dependent of both the salience of the norm and the instrumental
decision-making (see Text S1 for details). The agent-based model
is a dynamic one in which the propensity to follow the norm
changes over time depending on the behaviour observed during
the interaction and, in this sense, goes beyond the purely static
social preference models.
Simulations reproduce the public-good game used in the
laboratory and the three experimental conditions: punishment,
message and sanction. The goal of the simulation is to check that
the result obtained by the agents in the simulation resembles that
of the humans in the laboratory, supporting therefore that the
explanation given in terms of the norm psychology is a plausible
explanation for the observed human behaviour.
Depending on the relevant treatment, agents can, like humans,
decide whether or not to cooperate, punish, and send messages.
Cooperation choices are binary: each agent chooses whether to
cooperate (C) by contributing a fixed amount or to defect by
contributing nothing (D). Cooperation choices depend on a
probability that varies at each round as a function of the force
of both an individual drive and a normative drive (see Text S1 for
details).
The individual drive (ID) approximates the instrumental
decision-making processes. It pushes agents to maximize their
own personal utility regardless of what the norm prescribes and is
updated according to a winner-stay-losers-change algorithm [28].
The more an action increases the agent’s payoffs, the higher the
probability it will be chosen. The individual drive directs the
choice toward cooperation (C) only when the benefit of defecting is
lower than the benefit of cooperating. Agents’ payoffs depend on
their actions, and they are lowered according to the costs sustained
when imposing punishment or sanction and when receiving
them.The normative drive (ND) models the motivation to comply
as dependent on norm salience. Norm salience is a parameter
updated by each agent at every round according to the
information gathered by observing the behaviour of the other
agents and by communicating with them (see Table S4 included in
the Supporting Information for details). The values of this
parameter have been calibrated on the data extracted from [23].
The cooperation probability changes over time depending on
the values that the individual drive and the normative drive of
each agent take. The cooperation probability varies across agents,
thus generating heterogeneity withing the population. The
tendency to cooperate is always positively affected by the
normative drive and possibly by the individual drive, if cooper-
ation returns higher payoffs than defection. In this case the two
drives complement each other. Conversely, it will be negatively
affected by the individual drive, when defection returns higher
payoffs than cooperation. In this second case, one drive goes
against the other (see Text S1 for details about the Agents’
Strategies Updating).
The probability of punishing is negatively affected by the
number of defectors, while the probability of sending a message
indicating that the norm prescribes to cooperate (C) (associated or
not with punishment) is a direct function of the perceived salience
Punish Voice
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of the norm (see Text S1 for details). Punishment is costly and its
intensity is binary (high or low). The cost of being punished is
always greater than the net cost of cooperating. Figure S6 in the
Supporting Information shows the use of high and low punishment
and of normative messages in the simulations for each of the three
treatments.
Results and Discussion
4. Simulation Experiment: Results and Discussion
Figure 2A–B shows simulation results about cooperation levels
and punishment frequency. The simulation data are consistent
with the human data (confront Figure 1A–C and Figure 2A–B;
Figures S8, S9, S10 show alternative parameterizations of the
simulation model).
In the sanction treatment, from round 11 to 30, agents reach
higher and more stable contribution levels than in the punishment
treatment, and punish less. Hence, the strength of the normative
drive is higher in the sanction than in the punishment treatment.
In the latter, the normative drive is poorly solicited because of the
lack of explicit information about the norm, thus the behaviour is
mainly guided by the individual drive (details are presented in
Figure S5 and a discussion of these results is provided in Text S1).
In the message treatment the initial contribution level is similar to
the sanction treatment, but later declines substantially. As norm
violations are not followed by material punishment, the salience of
the norm C rapidly decreases, and the individual drive turns
agents toward D. After round 20, when agents cannot punish or
send messages anymore, the level of cooperation remains higher in
the sanction than in the other two treatments, since agents have
learned the norm and the normative drive strengthens the
resilience of cooperative behaviour (Figure S7 shows average
payoffs of the agents in the three treatments). In the third block
(rounds 21–30), the decline of cooperation level in the agent-based
simulations is faster than in the human data, and also faster than in
[29]. One possible explanation is that – once a high level of
cooperation is reached – human behaviour is somewhat less
adaptive than that of the simulated agents. When humans realize
Figure 2. (A–B) Results of the simulation experiments. Panel A depicts the cooperation levels observed in the simulation experiments. Agents
are initialized with Individual Weight = 0.5; Normative Weight = 0.5; Initial Punishment Probability = 0.5; Forgetting Probability = 0.3 (for a parameter
space exploration, see Text S1). The simulation experiment generates trends similar to the ones obtained with human subjects (compare Figure 1A
and Figure 2B). After round 10, cooperation levels are higher in the sanction treatment than in the punishment treatment, because of the combined
effect of the normative message and the monetary punishment. Panel B depicts the punishment frequency in the simulation experiments. Simulation
results show that the frequency of punishment is significantly higher in the punishment treatment than in the sanction treatment, resulting in a less
violent society even obtaining a higher cooperation rates as shown in the previous figure (compare Figure 1C and Figure 2B).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064941.g002
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in round 21 that, given the absence of punishment and messages,
cooperation tends to fall they may try to actively resist the decline
in cooperation. This effort is eventually futile, but does slow down
the contribution decline to some extent.
Conclusions
Both our results show that norm communication boosts
cooperation and material punishment serves to maintain it. This
implies that it is not punishment that prescribes people how to
behave, but norms. Punishment is a supplementary mechanism
through which norms are made salient and the expected
consequences of violating them more certain. Norms create an
environment in which the infliction of punishment has to be less
frequent and severe and its detrimental effect is mitigated [1–
2,30]. This may help to understand the evolution of punishment
[31].
Consistency between computational and laboratory data
supports our inferences on the proximate mechanisms that
promote human cooperation. Humans are provided with a norm
psychology to detect norms and track their salience. In real world
environments, which typically involve the combined use of norms
and coercive devices, human cooperation results from the
interplay of norm psychology and instrumental decision-making.
Materials and Methods
5. Ethics Statement
Our experiment is about decision-making and involves no
physical intervention. All our experimental sessions were conduct-
ed with the informed consent of all adult participants, who knew
that they were free to withdraw from participation at any time.
Individuals invited to one of our sessions had previously
voluntarily registered in the LINEEX laboratory of the University
of Valencia database. To do that they had to go to LINEEX
website. On that website the rules of the lab were available.
Informed consent was indicated by electronic acceptance of an
invitation to attend an experimental session. The voluntary
registration in the electronic database documents participants’
acceptance. The experiments were conducted following the
procedures established by LINEEX laboratory of the University
of Valencia. Our study was approved by the Director of the
LINEEX laboratory (Professor Enrique Fata´s) at an ethics review
and project proposal meeting that is required for all experiments
conducted at the LINEEX facilities.
6. Experiments with Human Subjects
Participants and procedure. The laboratory experiments
with humans were conducted between March and May 2011 at
the LINEEX laboratory of the University of Valencia. 144
participants were recruited from a pool of undergraduate students
from the University of Valencia and voluntarily participated in the
3 sessions of our experiment. Special care was exerted to recruit
students from many different disciplines to increase the likelihood
that the subjects had never met before. Each participant was
allowed to take part in only one session. On arrival, participants
were immediately led to separate cubicles. Instructions on general
behavior in the lab and specific instruction about the game to be
played were read by a mother tongue laboratory assistant. The
experiment was programmed by using the z-tree platform [32].
Instructions (for the sanction treatment). The purpose of
this experiment is to study how individuals make decisions in
certain contexts. The instructions are simple and if you follow
them carefully you will be paid a cash amount of money privately,
since nobody will know about the earnings of the other
participants. You can ask questions at any moment by raising
your hand. Apart from these questions, any type of communica-
tion between you is not allowed and may lead to exclusion from
the experiment.
1. For your participation in this experiment you obtain an
initial payment of 200 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit).
The experiment has 30 rounds. In each round you are part
of the same group of 4 participants, the composition of
which is determined in round 1 and does not vary during
the whole experiment.
2. The groups are formed by the participants in this room, and
the groups will be randomly formed by the server at the
beginning of the experiment.
3. Within each group, each participant will randomly receive
an identification number at the beginning of the experi-
ment. This number will be used to identify the decisions
made by each participant within a group, but nobody will
know the identity of the members of the group and all
actions that you will take during the experiment will be
absolutely anonymous.
4. In each round you will make decisions in two phases. At the
end of each phase, you will receive information about the
decisions of all the members of your group.
5. The first phase consists in deciding how much to contribute
to a common good. At the beginning of the phase you will
receive 20 ECUs and you will have to decide how much to
invest in the common good and how much to keep for you.
Your decision and those of the other participants will affect
the payoff you will receive in this phase:
5.
E~20{ciz0:4:ck
where E is your payoff, ci is your own contribution and ck is
the total of contributions by the rest of participants
5. After deciding how much to contribute to the common
good, you have to press the button ‘‘continue.’’ Once you
will have pressed it your decision will be final.
6. Once all the participants in your group will have made their
decisions, you will on the screen the total amount of ECUs
contributed to the common good by each of the members of
your group (including your own contribution). This screen
will also show how many ECUs you have obtained,
calculated using the formula shown above.
7. In the second phase you will be able to assign between 0 and
10 punishment points that will receive the payoffs obtained
by the members of the group to which you assign such
points. Each punishment point has a cost of 1 ECU for you
and an effect of 3 ECUs for the receiver of the punishment.
That is, if you assign 1 punishment point to another
participant, he/she will have his payoff reduced by 3 ECUs.
7. Therefore, you have to decide how many punishment points
to assign to each of the member of your group. Once the
points are assigned, you have to press the button ‘‘continue’’
and your decision will be final.
7. Your payoff will be affected by the assigned points in the
following way:
E~20{ciz0:4:ck{p
2
i
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where pi is the total amount of points that you have assigned
to the other participants.
7. In addition, in this phase you have the possibility to indicate
to each of the other participants what the right behavior is,
by completing the following sentence and marking one of
the following options.
7. One should contribute X, because:
a) In this way we are all better off
b) It is what one should do
c) If not, it will have consequences for you.
7. This message has no direct effect on your payoffs or the
payoffs of the receiver of the message.
8. Once all participants in your group will have made their
decisions, you will see on the screen how many punishment
points have been assigned to you as well as each of the
messages that you have received.
8. These points have an effect on your final payoff in the
rounds, that is calculated in the following way:
E~20{ciz0:4:
Pn
k~1
ck{pi{3
:pr
8. Where pr is the total amount of punishment points received
from the other participants.
9. Observe that your final payoff can be negative if the cost of
your decisions in the second phase is higher than the payoff
obtained in the first phase. Note that in any case you can
avoid losses through your decisions.
10. At the end of the experiment you will be paid in cash and
privately your accumulated payoffs for the whole experi-
ment at the exchange rate of 40ECUs=J1
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